Indian authorities have had a major success in the fight against the illegal wildlife trafficking, which passes through Nepal and Tibet and into the Chinese mainland, following a series of arrests made in early November 2009, in particular that of Tashi Tsering, for many years a major figure in this trade. The arrests come at a time when, with a continuing strong and possibly growing demand in China for wildlife products, the trade appears to have regained vitality. Poaching and smuggling across the Himalayas suffered significant setbacks, firstly, when the Tibetan market dried up in 2006 and, secondly, when the Tibet-Nepal border was virtually sealed in 2008. Since then however, recent observations made in Tibet and Nepal, suggest that the old smuggling networks are reforming, indicating a return to 'business as usual'. Meanwhile, Chinese and Indian authorities seem more involved in accusing each other of corruption – both with varying degrees of justification - and failed protection policies than in devising the concerted action that is the only way of ending the trade for good.

Following a night raid by the wildlife crime unit of the Indian Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) on 05 November 2009, Tashi Tsering (also known as Babu), aged 50, and Tashi Lodroe, 30, were arrested in the predominantly Tibetan district of Majnukatila in north Delhi, India. The seizure made during the raid, consisting of two leopard skins, six otter skins and 4kg of red sandalwood (an ingredient in high demand for Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM))(1), is as such unremarkable, but the arrest of Tashi Tsering is of far greater importance as he is alleged to be the kingpin behind a major wildlife poaching and smuggling network, operating for many years from Kathmandu and Delhi and through Tibet, that has supplied China-based consumers. His accomplice, Tashi Lodroe, a drug addict, appears in contrast to be a mere footsoldier who only entered the trade some three or four years ago.

Recent developments in the trade

Following a strong appeal by the Dalai Lama in January 2006 to shun the trade and use of wildlife products, Tibetans in Tibet carried out mass fur burnings throughout Tibet in spring 2006(2). Apart from a striking testimony of Tibetan loyalty to their spiritual leader and a new determination to test the tolerance of the Chinese authorities by displaying it, the movement was a unique success in the history of environmental and animal protection, since the use of big cats' pelts virtually disappeared from all Tibetan regions within a few weeks. This situation has continued up to the present, although for a while Chinese authorities in Tibet, at least at a local level, defiantly encouraged the use of fur among officials. They also effectively supported Chinese traders, especially Chinese Muslims (Hui), in opening or taking over shops and stocking fur and wildlife skins, including tiger and leopard skins, despite this being banned under Chinese law. The virtual collapse of the Tibetan wildlife market, however, did not affect the far greater demand for wildlife products in mainland China, where they are particularly sought after as ingredients for TCM(3).

Shop sign of a Chinese Muslim restaurant in Kathmandu.

In 2008, the unrest that flared up in most parts of Tibet led to an almost total closure of the Himalayan border, seriously hindering any smuggling activities. Research conducted by TibetInfoNet has determined that the trade restarted around late summer 2008, albeit following a new modus operandi. The strong presence of security forces on the Tibetan side of the border made it virtually impossible for the established networks, made up largely of Tibetans and Nepalis, to smuggle their illicit goods across the border, as they did in the past. Chinese traders, mainly Chinese Muslims (Hui), already involved in the import/export business, however, were still able to move comfortably between Tibet and Nepal, and effectively slipped into the trade. Typically, these traders bring, via Tibet, various products manufactured in the Chinese mainland, sell these to Nepali wholesalers and then purchase goods, mainly handicrafts, in the Kathmandu valley, which they bring back across the border. These are sold, partly for the tourist market in Tibet, and increasingly also to specialised dealers in mainland China. Dependent on available shipping capacities, the Hui traders then started to supplement their freight with wildlife products known to obtain good prices in the People's Republic of China (PRC). In certain cases, however, they arrived in Kathmandu with clear orders from traffickers within China, or placed orders themselves with contacts in Nepal, and payed for and picked up the goods on subsequent trips.

With these developments, the centre of the wildlife trade was temporarily shifted from Boudhanath, in suburban Kathmandu, where most Tibetans and Nepalis of high-Himalayan ethnicities live, to Patan, the second biggest town in Kathmandu valley and the main centre for handicraft production by the Newar ethnic group. While this exemplifies the capacity of the wildlife traffic to swiftly adapt to new conditions, in practice the new route seems to have considerably diminished the volume of the illegal trade, if only temporarily. This is because handicrafts remain the main trade items of the merchants from China, thus limiting capacities for wildlife products, and perhaps also because these newcomers to the trade found only limited access to wildlife distribution networks within the PRC. Circumstantial evidence indicates that whatever lull was in place is unlikely to last as, with a more relaxed handling of security on the Nepal-Tibet border, the old cross-Himalayan wildlife smuggling networks that spread between India, Nepal, Tibet and the Chinese mainland have recently regained ground and are on course to re-establish their dominance over the illicit trade, irrespective of the recent arrests.

Dismantling an aggressive network

The clues that led to Tashi Tsering's network and his arrest came when the CBI arrested two notorious Indian poachers in a village in the Punjab, in India, on 11 October 2009(4).  Tashi Tsering was arrested during simultaneous raids in Majnukatila and Nagpur in central India where five Indians were caught with the skins of two tigers (one killed on 22 October 2009 and the other about three months before), 38.4 kg of tiger bones(5), body parts, teeth and IRs 200,000 (UK£2,600; US$4,300; EUR€2,860) in cash. Among the five were Tashi Tsering's main agent and broker, as well as the marksman of the gang, which are held responsible for wiping out the entire tiger population of the Sariska Tiger Reserve in Rajasthan, India. Two further members of the gang known to have supplied Tashi Tsering with tiger skins and bones, named as Keru and Bheema, were arrested later. Keru is reported to have supplied the two tiger skins seized during the Nagpur arrest. Bheema is a member of the network established by Sansar Chand, a major Indian wildlife smuggler of the past two decades, who is currently in prison. The two men belong to the Sansi tribe, many of whom reside in Delhi at Punjabi Basti, adjacent to the Tibetan camp of Majnukatila. Sansar Chand's house is in Sadar Bazaar, a market often frequented by Tibetans.

Although in earlier arrests, Tibetan and Nepali smugglers were caught with much larger stocks, the recent wave of arrests not only delivered Tashi Tsering, one of the most wanted wildlife traffickers, but also for the first time a whole network comprising poachers, middlemen, buyers and carriers. As such, it is one of the most successful blows ever against the wildlife trade between India and China, and one that occurs right at the time wildlife trafficking appeared to be regaining confidence after the increasing demand for wildlife products among consumers in China was beginning to make up for the setbacks of recent years.  

Blame games

These arrests took place just a few days after Chinese and Indian delegates at an international tiger workshop held in Kathmandu on 27-30 October were locked in a bitter dispute over China's lax wildlife protection regime and its insistence on carrying on with the controversial trade in farmed tigers for use in TCM. In response, Chinese delegates were critical of Indian sentencing policy, which they argued, with some justification, resulted in convicted Indian poachers and traders being released on bail or receiving light prison sentences. They also articulated the view that the illegal Indian market for shahtoosh, the wool of the protected Tibetan antelope, often involves smugglers exchanging tiger skins for shahtoosh, thus feeding the vicious circle of poachers and buyers both in India and China.

In apparent preparation for the workshop, China's official news agency Xinhua reported on 23 October that animal protection authorities in Qinghai province destroyed 2,282 Tibetan antelope hides confiscated from poachers to show resolution against killing of the rare species. "We want to show our unswerving attitude in combating poaching", Cedain Zhou, director of the Hoh Xil Nature Reserve Administration was reported as saying. He claimed that over the past decade, more than 4,000 Tibetan antelope skins have been confiscated. He also said that a shahtoosh shawl may fetch up to US$11,000 (UK£6,700; EUR€7,355) on the global market, which he blamed on “high fashion” beginning in the late 1980s in Europe and the United States, and which has fuelled the black market, leading to a slump in the population of Tibetan antelopes from 200,000 to 20,000 in 1997. "As long as the illegal trading and consumption of Tibetan antelope fur exists, there will be a long way ahead in protecting the species", he said.